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Abstract
Suppose that party A collects private information about its users, where each user’s data is represented
as a bit vector. Suppose that party B has a proprietary data mining algorithm that requires estimating
the distance between users, such as clustering or nearest neighbors. We ask if it is possible for party A
to publish some information about each user so that B can estimate the distance between users without
being able to infer any private bit of a user. Our method involves projecting each user’s representation
into a random, lower-dimensional space via a sparse Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform and then adding
Gaussian noise to each entry of the lower-dimensional representation. We show that the method preserves
differential privacy—where the more privacy is desired, the larger the variance of the Gaussian noise.
Further, we show how to approximate the true distances between users via only the lower-dimensional,
perturbed data. Finally, we consider other perturbation methods such as randomized response and draw
comparisons to sketch-based methods. While the goal of releasing user-specific data to third parties is
more broad than preserving distances, this work shows that distance computations with privacy is an
achievable goal.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an abundance of rich and fine-grained data about individuals in domains such
as healthcare, finance, retail, web search and social networks. It is desirable for data collectors to enable third
parties to perform complex data mining applications over such data. However, privacy is a natural obstacle
that arises when sharing data about individuals with third parties, since the data about each individual may
contain private and sensitive information.
We ask the following question: Is it possible to empower third parties with knowledge about users
without compromising privacy of the users? Suppose that party A collects private information about its
users, where each user’s data is represented as a bit vector. We focus on the setting where a third party
B has a proprietary data mining algorithm that requires estimating the distance between users, such as
clustering or nearest neighbors. We ask if it is possible for party A to publish some information about each
user so that B can estimate the distance between users without being able to infer any private bit of a
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user. Even in a scenario where the data mining algorithm is run by the data collector itself (that is, parties
A and B are the same), privacy breaches are possible if the result of data mining is to be published [19].
The reason is that complex algorithms that access private data can be susceptible to either unintended or
adversarial attacks [6]. While one way to address this problem is to design a sophisticated algorithm that
respects privacy (e.g., [7]), our approach can ensure that the data given as input to the algorithm itself does
not compromise user privacy.
Although estimating distances between users in a privacy-preserving manner is a fundamental primitive
in many data mining applications, the approaches known to date have certain short-comings. Approaches
resorting to user id anonymization while keeping the data unchanged have been shown to be badly insufficient
to preserve privacy [2, 29]. A random projection based method to preserve distance between users was
proposed in [22], but later work demonstrated concrete attacks to breach privacy on this method [14, 30].
These approaches suffer due to lack of a rigorous privacy definition. On the other hand, approaches to data
sharing such as the recently proposed provably private methods for search query and click data release [16,20]
accomplish it at the price of giving up on all user-level information.
Contributions: We describe a simple, natural way to publish a sketch of a user that simultaneously
preserves privacy and enables estimation of the distance between users. The main idea is to project a d-
dimensional vector representation of a user’s feature attributes into a lower k-dimensional space by first
applying a random Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform and then adding Gaussian noise N(0, σ2) to each bit
of the resulting vector. We prove that this perturbed lower-dimensional vector preserves differential privacy,
i.e., an attacker who knows all but one attribute of a user cannot recover the value of that attribute from
the published information with high confidence. In terms of utility, we show how to recover the distance
between users from the perturbed sketches. We show that the squared Euclidean distance between pairs of
users is preserved in expectation. Further, with high probability, the distance between users is preserved up
to the usual Johnson-Lindenstrauss factors plus an additive factor that depends on k and the variance of
the noise σ2.
We also compare our proposed solution to other candidate solutions. For instance, we compare to the
more straightforward solution of directly adding noise to the user × user distance matrix. We show that
in order to achieve the same privacy, the variance of the added noise is higher for the more direct method.
Concretely, we show that the projection-based method is better if the maximal weight of a user vector is much
smaller than the number of users. Also, we analyze a randomized response [32] method for data sharing. For a
fixed value of the target dimension k, we show that for nearby points (those within squared distance O(
√
k)),
both algorithms are inaccurate. Projection-based methods are better when pairs are medium distance apart,
i.e., between
√
k and
√
dk/ǫ2. Randomized response methods excel for pairs that are far apart.
While the problem of sharing data with third parties is more complex than producing sketches of user data
that preserve distances between users, this work offers a privacy-preserving method to enable third parties to
execute one of the core data-mining primitives. Since the goal of our work is to enable distance computations,
understandably it does not apply in situations and applications where proximity to a particular user is itself
sensitive information.
2 Preliminaries
We first describe how the users are represented in our model and provide a formal problem statement. Then
we discuss the measure of utility as well as the privacy definition. We also state a classic result on preserving
distances during dimensionality reduction which is crucial for our techniques to work.
2
2.1 User representation
We represent each user belonging to a set U of n users as a binary vector in d dimensions, where each
dimension corresponds to the value of an attribute (e.g. gender, interest/disinterest in a particular topic,
location information, etc.) We assume that the attribute meanings are not sensitive or, if they are, they
can be published in a privacy-preserving manner (say, using the techniques in Go¨etz et al. or Korolova et
al. [16, 20]).
Our goal can be formally stated as: Given a set of user profiles represented as vectors in d dimensions,
publish sketches of the user profiles that simultaneously preserve user privacy and enable third parties to
estimate pairwise distance between users.
2.2 Utility measure
We consider Euclidean (ℓ2) distance between users as the distance measure we aim to preserve, as it is a
natural choice for similarity search in high dimensions [15]. We discuss other distance measures in §5. Our
measure of utility is whether pairwise Euclidean distance between users can be recovered by a third party,
who has access only to the transformed privacy-preserving user profiles.
2.3 Privacy definition
Any system that employs heuristic notions of privacy suffers from the fundamental problem that an adversary
can come up with sophisticated attacks to breach the protection in ways that the system designer had not
anticipated. Hence we contend that it is crucial to design a data release method with provable privacy
guarantees. We adopt a rigorous approach to privacy introduced by Dwork et al. [12], which has gained
widespread recognition in recent years (see a survey [10]), and has been used to demonstrate the feasibility
of privacy-preserving data releases [3, 20, 23, 24]. We adopt a slight variant of the definition introduced
in Dwork et al. [11]:
Definition 1 ((ǫ, δ)-differential privacy). A (randomized) algorithm A satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, if
for all inputs X and X ′ differing in at most one user’s one attribute value, and for all sets of possible outputs
Dˆ ⊆ Range(A):
Pr[A(X) ∈ Dˆ] ≤ eǫ · Pr[A(X ′) ∈ Dˆ] + δ,
where the probability is computed over the random coin tosses of the algorithm.
Intuitively, the differential privacy guarantee states that an attacker who knows all attributes of all
users except one attribute of one user cannot infer with confidence the value of that attribute, from the
information published by the algorithm. The δ parameter corresponds to the probability with which the
preceding guarantee can fail, with δ typically thought of as O(1/n). The privacy guarantees also extend to
small collections of (not necessarily related) attributes.
The privacy guarantees may be achieved through introduction of noise to the output. In order to achieve
the more stringent privacy guarantee of (ǫ, 0)-differentially privacy, the noise added typically comes from the
Laplace distribution [12]. If one is willing to tolerate a more lenient guarantee of (ǫ, δ), the noise can be
added from the more tightly concentrated Normal distribution [11].
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2.4 Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform
A celebrated result in geometry, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma [18], states that for any set V of n
points in Rd, given λJL > 0 and k = Ω
(
logn
λ2
JL
)
, there exists a map that embeds the set into Rk, distorting
all pairwise distances within at most 1± λJL factor. The proof proceeds by showing that for any x, y ∈ Rd,
a linear projection P ∈ Rd×k sampled from a carefully defined class satisfies
(1− λJL)‖x− y‖22 ≤ ‖xP − yP‖22 ≤ (1 + λJL)‖x− y‖22
with certain probability 1 − δJL over the choice of the projection matrix, where log 1δJL = O(kλ2), and then
applying the union bound.
This transform has become a fundamental tool in dimensionality reduction and similarity search in high
dimensions, and computer science literature [1, 17] has proposed several constructions for P .
3 Construction and Usage of Privacy-Preserving Projections
We next describe the intuition as well as the technical components of our approach. Then we state our
privacy and utility guarantees and provide their proofs.
3.1 Algorithms for transforming user profiles and recovering distances
Our mechanism for enabling data sharing with privacy consists of two components: 1) an algorithm that
transforms the representation of each user into a privacy-preserving sketch and 2) an algorithm that recovers
distances between users from the transformed user sketches. The intuition for the design of our mechanism
is as follows: since we aim to preserve pairwise distances with the goal of performing user segmentation
and nearest neighbor computations, an algorithm that performs a privacy-preserving transformation of user
profiles while approximately maintaining pairwise distances would suffice. At the core of our method is a
one-time privacy-preserving transformation of user profiles that can be published. All subsequent operations
can be performed on this published data and therefore do not consume a “privacy budget” or pose additional
privacy risk.
Our algorithms are easy to state and implement, and do not require understanding of privacy. However
the proofs of privacy and utility guarantees are non-trivial and require deeper analysis.
3.1.1 Private projection algorithm
The goal of Algorithm 1 (PrivateProjection) is to transform an n × d representation of user data into
a representation that can be publicly shared without compromising the privacy of any individual involved
and can simultaneously preserve distance characteristics of the original representation. First, the data is
projected into a much lower dimension (k ≪ d) to obtain a compact representation that preserves pairwise
distances (steps 1–2), similar to many dimensionality reduction techniques. Then the resulting data is slightly
perturbed (steps 3–4) to guarantee privacy of each user. The benefit of projecting onto a lower dimension
and doing the perturbation is that we require less noise addition.
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Algorithm 1 PrivateProjection
Input: Boolean n × d matrix X whose rows correspond to people and columns correspond to attributes
learned about the users by first parties; Privacy parameters ǫ, δ; Projected dimension k.
Output: d × k projection matrix P ; privacy-preserving n × k matrix Z, both of which can be pub-
lished.
1: Construct random d× k projection matrix P .
2: Y := XP
3: Construct random n× k noise matrix ∆, based on privacy parameters ǫ, δ and projection matrix P .
4: Z := Y +∆
5: Publish (P,Z).
Intuitively, for a given level of desired privacy, there are two factors that affect utility and behave in
opposite directions as we vary the projected dimension k. On the one hand, as k gets smaller, dimensionality
reduction plays a greater role in the distortion of distances. On the other hand, as k gets larger, noise added
plays a greater role in the distortion of distances. Finding the optimal value for the projected dimension k is
challenging theoretically, as it depends on the underlying data distributions and the specific distance values
we are trying to preserve.
We next discuss the key components of Algorithm 1, namely, the choice of desired privacy guarantees
(ǫ, δ) which determines the distribution of the noise, the choice of projection matrix P (and its sensitivity)
and the corresponding choice of the parameters of the noise matrix’s distribution. We remark that the
projection matrix as well the noise matrix do not depend on X , but only require knowledge of the number
of users n, the original dimension d and the desired privacy parameters. Following Kerckhoffs’s Principle
in Cryptography, we assume that the algorithm as well as the parameters n, d, k, ǫ, δ, P and the parameters
used in the noise matrix are publicly known.
3.1.2 Choosing desired privacy guarantees
The first decision in utilizing Algorithm 1 (PrivateProjection) is to determine the privacy guarantees
desired by the algorithm’s curator. The crucial observation is that one is able to guarantee (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy by adding noise ∆ from the Normal distribution, with the variance of the noise depending on the ℓ2
sensitivity of the chosen projection matrix P , which we define next.
Definition 2 (ℓρ-Sensitivity of P ). Define the lρ-sensitivity of a d × k projection matrix P = {Pij}d×k,
denoted by wρ(P ), as the maximum ℓρ-norm of any row in P, i.e., wρ(P ) = max1≤i≤d
(∑k
j=1 |Pij |ρ
) 1
ρ .
Equivalently, wρ(P ) can be defined as maxei ‖eiP‖ρ, where {ei}di=1 are standard basis unit vectors.
3.1.3 Choosing projection matrix P
There are many ways to choose a projection matrix for dimensionality reduction, depending on the properties
of the data that need to be preserved. Our choice of P is guided by two considerations: (1) we would like
to preserve pairwise ℓ2 distances and thus user segmentation based on these distances (2) we would like to
minimize the amount of noise to be added in order to maximize utility while guaranteeing privacy in the
subsequent step.
The natural candidate projection matrices for (1), preserving ℓ2 distances between vectors, are the random
projection matrices satisfying Johnson-Lindenstrauss guarantees (§2.4), such as the ones below:
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1. Each entry of the matrix drawn independently from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and σ2 =
1/k. [17].
2. Each entry of the matrix drawn independently and uniformly at random from {− 1√
k
,+ 1√
k
} [1].
3. Each entry of the matrix is chosen independently to be +
√
3
k , 0,−
√
3
k with probability
1
6 ,
2
3 ,
1
6 , respec-
tively [1].
4. The extremely sparse projection matrix of Dasgupta et al. [9].
As we will see in the proof of privacy in Theorem 1, when using noise ∆ from Normal distribution,
the amount of noise needed to preserve privacy depends on the choice of the projection matrix P ; and
more precisely, on the ℓ2-sensitivity of the chosen P . It is therefore desirable to use a projection matrix
with low ℓ2 sensitivity, in order to ensure that we are adding the smallest possible amount of noise and
therefore, maximizing utility while preserving privacy. The expected ℓ2 sensitivity of all of the random
projection matrices described above is tightly concentrated around 1 (using the alternative definition of
w2(P ) = maxei ‖eiP‖2, where {ei}di=1 are standard basis unit vectors, and by applying the proofs of low
distortion for these matrices) and therefore, all of them are suitable for privacy preserving transformations
that aim to preserve the maximum utility.
We emphasize that the specific measure of sensitivity of the matrix P , namely ℓ2-sensitivity, is driven by
the type of noise added for privacy, which is Normal in our case, and not by the choice of norm one seeks to
preserve under projection.
3.1.4 The random noise matrix ∆
The choice of the desired privacy guarantees and projection matrix P determines the noise matrix ∆. Each
entry in ∆ is drawn randomly and independently from Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
σ2, where the variance of the noise depends on ℓ2-sensitivity of the projection matrix P and the privacy
parameters ǫ and δ. By choosing σ satisfying the condition in Theorem 1, the algorithm guarantees (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
3.1.5 Recover distance algorithm
We next describe our algorithm for estimating the squared distance between two users, given their sketches
released in a privacy-preserving manner using Algorithm 1. Algorithm 2 (RecoverDistancePP) computes
the squared ℓ2 distance between the transformed representations in the k dimensional space, and then
discounts for the systemic positive distortion of the distance due to noise addition. The discount 2kσ2
represents the expected distortion in the squared distance due to Gaussian noise addition.
By repeated application of Algorithm 2, a third party can perform user segmentation and study the
characteristics of the segments, as well as perform nearest-neighbor computations.
Algorithm 2 RecoverDistancePP
Input: n × k matrix Z published in a privacy-preserving manner; Noise parameter σ; Indices a, b of the
desired users.
Output: Estimated squared distance between users a and b in the original
space.
1: Let xˆ and yˆ be the ath and bth rows in Z, respectively.
2: Output dist2PP(usera, userb) = ‖xˆ− yˆ‖22 − 2kσ2.
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3.2 Formal privacy and utility guarantees
We now prove formal privacy and utility guarantees for the blueprints of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, for
the case when noise ∆ is drawn from Normal distribution and the utility goal is to preserve ℓ2 distance
between users.
3.2.1 Privacy guarantees
As Algorithm 2 uses already published data, it is sufficient to provide privacy guarantees for Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. Let w2(P ) be the ℓ2-sensitivity of the projection matrix P (see Definition 2). Assuming δ <
1
2 ,
let the entries of the noise matrix be drawn from N(0, σ2) with σ ≥ w2(P )
√
2(ln( 1
2δ
)+ǫ)
ǫ . Then Algorithm 1
satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy wrt a change in an individual person’s attribute.
A surprising feature of the algorithm and one that will turn out to be crucial for the utility of the algorithm
is that the amount of noise one needs to add in order to satisfy privacy guarantees does not depend on the
dimensions of the projection matrix P other than through a (possible) dependence of sensitivity w2(P ) on
P ’s dimension. The work of McSherry and Mironov [24] uses a similar observation relating multi-dimensional
Gaussian noise and privacy guarantees without detailing the proof, so we provide the proof for completeness.
We first prove a more general geometric statement, which we will then use to prove the privacy guarantees
of our algorithm. The lemma extends the result of Dwork et al. [11] to multiple dimensions.
Lemma 1. Let Y and Y ′ be points in Rl s.t. ‖Y − Y ′‖2 ≤ w. Then for any Dˆ ⊂ Rl, and any ∆ drawn
from N l(0, σ2), where σ ≥ w
√
2(ln( 1
2δ
)+ǫ)
ǫ and δ <
1
2 , the following inequality holds: Pr[Y
′ + ∆ ∈ Dˆ] ≤
eǫ Pr[Y +∆ ∈ Dˆ] + δ.
Proof. The crucial insight is that due to spherical symmetry properties of Gaussian noise, we may choose
the basis in such a way that Y and Y ′ differ in exactly one dimension.
Partition Dˆ into two sets of points: Dˆin = {D ∈ Dˆ : 〈Y ′ − Y,D − Y ′〉 ≤ wR} and Dˆout = {D ∈
Dˆ : 〈Y ′ − Y,D − Y ′〉 > wR}. The value of R will be determined later. We first prove that
Pr[Y ′ +∆ ∈ Dˆin] ≤ eǫ Pr[Y +∆ ∈ Dˆin], if R ≥ 2ǫσ
2 − w2
2w
, (1)
and then prove that
Pr[Y ′ +∆ ∈ Dˆout] ≤ δ, if R ≥ σ
√
2 ln(
1
2δ
). (2)
By choosing σ so that R satisfies both constraints of (1) and (2), summing the resulting inequalities, and
observing that Pr[Y +∆ ∈ Dˆin] ≤ Pr[Y +∆ ∈ Dˆ], we will obtain the desired bound.
Proof of (1). By assumption R ≥ 2ǫσ2−w22w . By definition of the Gaussian noise
Pr[Y ′ +∆ ∈ Dˆin] = 1
(
√
2πσ)k
∫
Dˆin
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y ′ − z‖22
)
dz.
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The density function restricted to Dˆin satisfies:
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y ′ − z‖22
)
= exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(‖Y − z‖22 − ‖Y − Y ′‖22 − 2〈Y ′ − Y, z − Y ′〉)
)
= exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y − z‖22
)
· exp
(
1
2σ2
(‖Y − Y ′‖22 + 2〈Y ′ − Y, z − Y ′〉)
)
≤ exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y − z‖22
)
· exp
(
w2 + 2wR
2σ2
)
≤ exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y − z‖22
)
· exp (ǫ) .
It implies that
Pr[Y ′ +∆ ∈ Dˆin] = 1
(
√
2πσ)k
∫
Dˆin
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y ′ − z‖22
)
dz
≤ 1
(
√
2πσ)k
∫
Dˆin
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y − z‖22
)
exp(ǫ) dz ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[Y +∆ ∈ Dˆin].
Proof of (2). Recall that R ≥ σ
√
2 ln( 12δ ). We choose the coordinate system so that Y = (y1, . . . , yk) and
Y ′ = (y′1, . . . , y
′
k) differ only in the first coordinate and y
′
1 < y1. Then
Dˆout = {D ∈ Dˆ : 〈Y ′ − Y,D − Y ′〉 > wR} ⊆ {z ∈ Rk : (y′1 − y1)(z1 − y′1) > wR},
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which implies the following bound on the probability of Y ′ +∆ falling inside Dˆout:
Pr[Y ′ +∆ ∈ Dˆout] = 1
(
√
2πσ)k
∫
Dˆout
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y ′ − z‖22
)
dz
≤ 1
(
√
2πσ)k
∫
((y′
1
−y1)(z1−y′1)>wR
∫ +∞
−∞
. . .
∫ +∞
−∞
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
‖Y ′ − z‖22
)
dz1 . . . dzk
=
1
(
√
2πσ)k
∫
(y′
1
−y1)(z1−y′1)>wR
∫ +∞
−∞
. . .
∫ +∞
−∞
k∏
i=1
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(y′i − zi)2
)
dz1 . . . dzk
=
1√
2πσ
∫
(y′
1
−y1)(z1−y′1)>wR
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(y′1 − z1)2
)
dz1
=
1√
2πσ
∫ wR
y′
1
−y1
+y′
1
−∞
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(y′1 − z1)2
)
dz1
=
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
wR
y′
1
−y1 + y
′
1 − y′1√
2σ
))
=
1
2
(
1− erf
(
wR√
2σ(y1 − y′1)
))
≤ 1
2
exp
(
−
(
wR√
2σ(y1 − y′1)
)2)
(∗)
≤ 1
2
exp
(
− w
2R2
2σ2w2
)
=
1
2
exp
(
− R
2
2σ2
)
≤ δ,
if R ≥ σ
√
2 ln( 12δ ). The bound (∗) follows from 1− erf(x) ≤ exp(−x2) for x > 0 [8].
Hence, for (1) and (2) to hold simultaneously, we need
σ
√
2 ln(
1
2δ
) ≤ R ≤ 2ǫσ
2 − w2
2w
and R > 0.
By solving the resulting quadratic inequality we conclude that Lemma 1 holds if σ ≥ w
√
ln( 1
2δ
)+
√
ln( 1
2δ
)+ǫ√
2ǫ
and δ < 12 . The claim follows by observing that
√
2(ln( 12δ ) + ǫ) >
√
ln( 12δ ) +
√
ln( 12δ ) + ǫ.
Proof of Theorem 1. The intuition behind the proof is to observe that a one-element difference in matrices
X and X ′ will affect only one row of the projection.
To prove that Algorithm 1 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we need to prove that for any two input
matrices X and X ′, which differ in one element xaj (corresponding to user a having 1 or 0 value for attribute
j), and for any Dˆ, where Dˆ is a set of possible outputs of the algorithm, namely a set of n× k matrices, the
following inequality holds over the random choices of the algorithm:
Pr[X ′P +∆ ∈ Dˆ] ≤ eǫ Pr[XP +∆ ∈ Dˆ] + δ,
where ∆ is a n× k noise matrix, in which each element is drawn independently at random from N(0, σ2).
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Fix X and X ′, and recall the notation of Algorithm 1. Wlog view Y and Y ′ (in a natural way) as flattened
vectors of length nk rather than n× k matrices. Observe that if X and X ′ are binary and ‖X ′ −X‖2 = 1,
then ‖Y ′ − Y ‖2 = ‖X ′P −XP‖2 = ‖(X ′ −X) · P‖2 ≤ max1≤i≤d
√∑k
j=1 P
2
ij = w2(P ). Applying the result
of Lemma 1 to Y and Y ′, we obtain the desired privacy guarantee.
We remark that Theorem 1 applies even if the input matrix X consists of values in [0, 1] instead of
Boolean values.
In Figure 1 we depict the exact relationship between the privacy parameters ǫ and δ, and the variance
of the noise needed, by plotting three curves of feasible (ǫ, δ) pairs for three choices of σ. The chart can be
used either to determine legitimate values of ǫ and δ for a fixed σ, or vice versa. Fixing the value σ to 1.0
implies (ǫ, δ)-privacy for all values of ǫ, δ in the middle curve. Alternatively, one can fix the values (ǫ, δ) to
(1, 0.1) and find a noise level σ ≈ 1.0 that passes through the point.
!"
!#$"
!#%"
!#&"
!#'"
!#("
!#)"
!#*"
!#+"
!" !#%" !#'" !#)" !#+" $" $#%" $#'" $#)" $#+" %"
!
"
#"
,"-"!#(" ,"-"$#!" ,"-"%#!"
!
"
Figure 1: Feasible values of ǫ, δ for a given choice of σ.
3.2.2 Utility guarantees for the Gaussian projection
We next discuss the utility guarantees provided by our algorithms. We show that the squared Euclidean
distance between two user vectors is preserved in expectation after the privacy transformations performed
by our algorithms, and further provide guarantees on how far the distance after transformation can deviate
from the original distance. From a third party’s perspective, these guarantees imply that (a) the users who
are close in the original space are likely to remain close in the transformed space and (b) similarly the users
who are far apart are likely to remain so after the transformations.
Concrete utility guarantees depend on the type of the projection matrix P . Among the possible choices
for projection matrices described in Section 3.1.3, we analyze the guarantees afforded by the use of the
Gaussian projection matrix due to Indyk and Motwani [17], proving that the resulting estimate of the
squared Euclidean distance is unbiased, computing its variance and giving a tail probability bound.
Although Algorithm 1 is stated as applied to n user vectors simultaneously, we will analyze its utility in
preserving squared distances between a particular fixed pair of users. Consider two user vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}d
which are transformed by Algorithm 1 into xˆ = xP+∆1 and yˆ = yP+∆2, where ∆1 and ∆2 are independent
k-dimensional Gaussians Nk(0, σ2).
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Recall that according to Theorem 1 in order for Algorithm 1 to satisfy (ǫ, δ) differential privacy, σ is
determined as a function of ǫ, δ, and w2(P ), which in turn depends on the projection matrix P . The
following lemma bounds σ for a given setting of ǫ, δ and k.
Lemma 2. Let the projection matrix P be d× k matrix whose entries are i.i.d. N(0, 1/k) random variables.
Algorithm 1 using the noise matrix whose entries are sampled from N(0, σ2) satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
if
σ ≥ 4
ǫ
√
ln(1/δ),
k > 2(ln d+ ln(2/δ)),
and
ǫ < ln(1/δ).
Proof. According to Theorem 1, (ǫ, δ/2)-differential privacy is satisfied if
σ ≥ w2(P )
√
2(ln(1/δ) + ǫ)
ǫ
, (3)
where w2(P ) is P ’s ℓ2-sensitivity. Since the entries of P are distributed as Gaussians, its sensitivity w2(P )
has the following distribution:
w2(P ) ∼
√√√√√max
1≤i≤d

 k∑
j=1
|N(0, 1/k)|2

 ∼√ max
1≤i≤d
1
k
Zi,
where Zi’s are i.i.d. χ
2
k variables (i.e., distributed according to the chi-squared distribution with k degrees
of freedom). Choosing x = ln d+ ln(2/δ) and applying Lemma 4 (see Appendix), we find that
Pr
[
w2(P ) > 1 +
√
2x
k
]
< δ/2.
Under the assumption that k > 2(ln d+ln(2/δ)), the probability that w2(P ) is greater than 2 is less than δ/2.
Combining this bound with (3), we find that Algorithm 1 satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for ǫ < ln(1/δ) if
σ ≥ 4
ǫ
√
ln(1/δ) >
2
ǫ
√
2(ln(1/δ) + ǫ) and k > 2(ln d+ ln(2/δ)),
which completes the proof.
The proof of Lemma 2 implies that the value of σ can be chosen independent of P . This property is
crucial for the following argument, which repeatedly uses independence of the matrix P and the noise ∆
(scaled by σ).
Theorem 2. Algorithms 1 and 2, where entries of P are sampled from N(0, 1/k), and σ is chosen indepen-
dently of the realization of P , satisfy the following utility guarantees:
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1. dist2PP is an unbiased estimator of ‖x− y‖22:
E[dist2PP(x, y)] = ‖x− y‖22.
2. Variance of dist2PP is given by the following expression:
Var[dist2PP(x, y)] = 2‖x− y‖42/k + 8σ2‖x− y‖22 + 8σ4k.
3. Deviations are bounded, i.e., with probability 1− (δJL + δχ2 + δN ), the following holds:∣∣dist2PP(x, y)− ‖x− y‖22∣∣ ≤ λJL‖x − y‖22 + 4σ2√kλχ2 + 4σ2λ2χ2 + 4σ(1 + λJL)λN‖x − y‖2, (4)
when λJL < 1/2, δJL ≥ 2 exp(−kλ2JL/6), δχ2 ≥ 2 exp(−λ2χ2 ) and δN ≥ exp(−λ
2
N )
λN
√
π
.
Proof. First we note that ∆ = ∆1 − ∆2 is distributed as a k-dimensional Gaussian Nk(0, 2σ2). We can
express the random variable dist2PP(x, y) as a sum of three random variables Z1, Z2, Z3:
dist2PP(x, y) = ‖xˆ− yˆ‖22 − 2kσ2 = ‖xP +∆1 − yP −∆2‖22 − 2kσ2 =
= ‖(x− y)P +∆‖22 − 2kσ2 = ‖(x− y)P‖22︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z1
+2〈(x− y)P,∆〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z2
+ ‖∆‖22 − 2kσ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z3
.
For the given fixed choice of user vectors x and y, let z = x−y = (z1, . . . , zd) and r = ‖x−y‖2. Since the
entries of P are i.i.d. according to N(0, 1/k), the projection (x−y)P is distributed according to Nk(0, r2/k).
Indeed, the ith entry of (x− y)P has the following distribution:
d∑
j=1
zjN(0, 1/k) ∼
d∑
j=1
N(0, z2j /k) ∼ N(0,
d∑
j=1
z2j /k) ∼ N(0, r2/k).
Using the above expression and Lemma 6 we may write the variables Z1, Z2, Z3 as follows:
Z1 ∼
∥∥Nk(0, ‖x− y‖22/k)∥∥22 = r2 · χ2k/k,
Z2 ∼ N(0, 8σ2Z1),
Z3 ∼ 2σ2χ2k − 2kσ2,
where χ2k is the chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom defined as the distribution of a sum of
the squares of k independent N(0, 1) random variables.
Claim 1. To show that dist2PP(x, y) is an unbiased estimator for r
2 = ‖x − y‖22 observe that the mean of
the chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom is k. Therefore,
E[Z1] = E
[
r2 · χ2k/k
]
= r2,
E[Z2] = 0,
E[Z3] = 0,
and thus
E[dist2PP(x, y)] = E[Z1] + E[Z2] + E[Z3] = r
2.
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Claim 2. To compute the variance of dist2PP(x, y), express it as
Var
(
dist2PP(x, y)
)
= Var(Z1 + Z2 + Z3) = E[(Z1 + Z2 + Z3)
2]− (E[Z1 + Z2 + Z3])2 =
= E[Z21 + Z
2
2 + Z
2
3 + 2Z1Z2 + 2Z1Z3 + 2Z2Z3]−
(
E[Z1] + E[Z2] + E[Z3]
)2
. (5)
Recall that by assumption of the theorem, σ is chosen independently of P , therefore, (x− y)P and ∆ are
independent. The expectations of the pairwise products can be evaluated as follows:
E[Z1Z2] = E
[‖(x− y)P‖22 · 2〈(x− y)P,∆〉] = E [2〈‖(x− y)P‖22 · (x− y)P,∆〉] = 0, (by Lemma 6)
E[Z1Z3] = E[Z1]E[Z3] = 0, (since Z1 and Z3 are independent)
E[Z2Z3] = E
[
2〈(x− y)P,∆〉 · (‖∆‖22 − 2kσ2)
]
= E
[
2〈(x− y)P,∆ · (‖∆‖22 − 2kσ2)〉
]
= 0. (by Lemma 6)
Analyzing the other terms in equation (5), we have
E[Z21 ]− E[Z1]2 = Var(Z1) = Var(r2 · χ2k/k) =
r4
k2
Var(χ2k) =
r4
k2
2k =
2r4
k
,
E[Z23 ]− E[Z3]2 = Var(Z3) = Var(2σ2χ2k − 2kσ2) = 4σ4Var(χ2k) = 8σ4k,
since Var(χ2k) = 2k.
To finish the computation, we need to evaluate E[Z22 ]. Recall that Z2 = 2〈(x−y)P,∆〉, where (x−y)P ∼
Nk(0, r2/k) and ∆ ∼ Nk(0, 2σ2). Since E[Z2] = 0, the second moment of Z2 is Var(Z2), which can be
computed as follows:
Var(Z2) = Var
(
2
k∑
i=1
N(0, r2/k) ·N(0, 2σ2)
)
= kVar
(
2N(0, r2/k) ·N(0, 2σ2)) = 8r2σ2,
(the last equation is because the mean of both Gaussians is zero, in which case the variance of the product
of two independent variables is the product of their variances).
Putting the above expressions together into equation (5) we obtain
Var(dist2PP(x, y)) = 2r
4/k + 8σ2r2 + 8σ4k,
as claimed.
Claim 3. Towards proving deviation bounds, observe that∣∣Z1 − r2∣∣ < λJLr2 with probability at least 1− δJL (by [1, Lemma 4.1])
|Z2| ≤ 4σλN
√
Z1 with probability at least 1− δN (Lemma 5 in Appendix)
|Z3| ≤ 4σ2
√
kλχ2 + 4σ
2λ2χ2 with probability at least 1− δχ2 . (by [21, Lemma 1])
Using the union bound and plugging in the bound on Z1 into the second expression, we obtain the desired
bound.
By [1, Lemma 4.1]
∣∣Z1 − r2∣∣ < λJLr2 with probability at least
1− 2 exp(−k
2
(λ2JL/2− λ2JL/3)) > 1− 2 exp(−kλ2JL/6) ≥ 1− δJL,
if λJL < 1/2 and δJL ≥ 2 exp(−kλ2JL/6).
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Optimal projection dimension: A natural question that our analysis leaves open is how to find an
optimum number of dimensions k to which we should project.
• To find the asymptotic of the optimal target dimension k for a fixed setting of the noise σ and the failure
probability δJL+δχ2+δN , we equate the failure probabilities µ = δJL = δχ2 = δN for some fixed µ < 1/3.
From the conditions on the λ’s in the statement of Theorem 2 it follows that λχ2 = Θ(
√
log 1/µ),
λN = Θ(
√
log 1/µ), and λJL = Θ(
√
log 1/µ
k ). Optimizing the upper bound (4) for k we obtain that
kOPT = Θ(
√
log 1/µ · ‖x− y‖22/σ2).
• Another approach for finding the optimal target dimension k for a fixed setting of the noise σ would
be to aim to minimize the variance of the squared distance estimate returned by the algorithm, which
happens for kOPT =
‖x−y‖2
2
2σ2 .
Both of these analytic approaches imply that the optimal value for the target dimension of the privacy-
preserving Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform depends on the expected distance between vectors measured
using this mechanism, and it scales inversely proportionally to σ2 = Θ(ln(1/δ)/ǫ2) (Lemma 2). For this
choice of the parameters, the (additive) error in measuring ‖x − y‖22 is O(σ
√
log 1/µ · ‖x − y‖2) and holds
with probability 1− µ assuming that log 1/µ≪ k. The variance of the estimator when k = ‖x− y‖22/(2σ2)
is 16σ2 · ‖x− y‖22. An algorithm designer applying this algorithm in practice could consider using different
projection matrices with varying k’s each optimized for a particular range of distances, and would need a
logarithmic (in terms of possible distances) number of such projections.
4 Alternative Approaches
In this section we consider alternative approaches to release of pairwise distances of n vectors in Rd. The
first approach is based on output perturbation, where the noise is added directly to the final outcome of the
mechanism, i.e., the n×n matrix of all pairwise distances. We argue that this method is inferior to privacy-
preserving projections (previous section) in most settings. The other method is based on input perturbation,
where the noise is added to the raw d-dimensional vectors. We compare the method to privacy-preserving
projections, and discuss their ranges of applicability.
4.1 Direct Noise Addition
A classic result in differential privacy [11] shows that any function can be computed with (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy as long as the Gaussian noise calibrated according to the ℓ2-sensitivity of that function is added
to the true function value prior to its announcement (Lemma 1). Thus, a natural alternative approach to
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform-based algorithm that we proposed is an algorithm publishing noisy
versions of pairwise distances between points by adding properly calibrated noise to the true distances. We
formalize this approach in Algorithms 3 and 4.
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Algorithm 3 NoiseAddition
Input: Boolean n × d matrix X whose rows correspond to people and columns correspond to attributes
learned about the users by first parties; Privacy parameters ǫ, δ.
Output: Privacy-preserving strictly upper triangular n × n matrix Z, whose entries correspond to noisy
pairwise distances squared, which can be published.
1: Construct random n× n strictly upper triangular noise matrix ∆, based on privacy parameters ǫ, δ.
2: Let Y be a strictly upper triangular n× n matrix, such that for 1 ≤ i < n, i < j ≤ n, yi,j = ||xi − xj ||22.
3: Z := Y +∆
4: Publish Z.
Algorithm 4 RecoverDistanceNA
Input: n × n matrix Z published in a privacy-preserving manner; Noise parameter σ; Indices a, b of the
desired users (assume a < b wlog).
Output: Estimated squared distance between users a and b.
1: Output dist2NA(usera, userb) = za,b.
Similarly to the analysis in Section 3.2.1, Algorithm 3 preserves privacy if σ >
√
n · 2(ln( 12δ ) + ǫ)/ǫ if
δ < 1/2, since a change in a single bit of X causes n changes in the matrix Y , each of magnitude one.
Following the analysis of the previous section, consider the variance of the estimator dist2NA. Since it is
obtained by adding Gaussian noise drawn from N(0, σ2), it is exactly σ2:
Var(dist2NA) = σ
2 = Θ(n ln(1/δ)/ǫ2).
Notice that the variance of the estimator is linear in the number of users n (i.e., rows of the matrix X).
4.2 Comparison between PrivateProjection and NoiseAddition
We use variance of the estimators to compare the accuracy of two methods for release of privacy-preserving
pairwise distances. Recall that
Var[dist2PP(x, y)] = 2‖x− y‖42/k + 8σ2PP‖x− y‖22 + 8σ4PPk,
where σPP = Θ(
√
ln(1/δ)/ǫ) and k is the target dimension of the projection matrix. The distance ‖x− y‖2
for binary vectors x and y is equal to their Hamming distances, and does not exceed the sum of their weights.
Let the maximal weight of a user vector be µ. For the target dimension k = Θ(µ) (notice that it does not
have to be optimal for the the given ‖x− y‖22):
Var[dist2PP(x, y)] = 2‖x− y‖42/k + 8σ2PP‖x− y‖22 + 8σ4PPk = O(σ4PP · µ).
As argued in the previous section,
Var(dist2NA) = Θ(n ln(1/δ)/ǫ
2),
independent of x and y. We see that the the variance of the NoiseAddition method is larger than the
variance of PrivateProjection if µσ2PP = o(n). In other words, the PrivateProjection method is
superior (in terms of the variance of the estimator) if the maximal weight of a user vector is much smaller
than the total number of users.
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4.3 Randomized response
We next describe a technique known as randomized response studied by Warner in the 1960s [32]. Random-
ized response is a natural, alternate solution to computing privacy-preserving user sketches. We compare
this solution to our PrivateProjection (PP) approach.
As before, we describe two separate algorithms: one technique for publishing data in a way that preserves
privacy and another technique for estimating the squared ℓ2 distance between the original vectors given only
the perturbed, private vectors. We show that randomized response’s strength is in preserving large distances
between users, whereas the strength of PP is in preserving small distances. Given the potential applications
that we consider, of user segmentation and finding users near a given user, we conclude that PP is a more
favorable solution.
4.3.1 Privacy guarantees
The algorithm suggested in the randomized response literature for preserving privacy is quite simple: Each
bit of a user’s vector is flipped with probability p (Algorithm 5). Observe that if p = 12 then the technique
achieves perfect privacy, since any vector is equally likely to be published. However, publishing a random
vector is worthless. On the other hand, if each bit is flipped with probability slightly less than 12 , as in
Algorithm 5, then one can show that some privacy is still preserved and yet the perturbed vectors can still
be used to estimate the actual distance between vectors.
Algorithm 5 RandomizedResponse
Input: Boolean n × d matrix X whose rows correspond to people and columns correspond to attributes;
Privacy parameter p < 12 .
Output: Privacy-preserving n× d matrix Xˆ.
1: Xˆij :=
{
Xij with probability 1− p
Xij with probability p
.
2: Publish Xˆ.
We discuss the relationship between the flipping probability p and differential privacy first.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 5 preserves (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy when log 1−pp ≤ ǫ, or equivalently when p ≥ 11+eǫ .
The proof [26,32] follows by considering two candidate vectors x and x′ that differ in only one bit position,
and showing that the ratio of the probability that xˆ is published given x to the probability that xˆ is published
given x′ is at most 1−pp . Setting this value to at most e
ǫ per the definition of differential privacy yields the
lemma.
4.3.2 Utility guarantees
We now demonstrate that a third party equipped with the perturbed, private vectors published by Algo-
rithm 5 can still approximate the squared ℓ2 distance between pairs of users, via Algorithm 6. The algorithm
first computes the squared ℓ2 distance between the perturbed representations, and then accounts for the sys-
temic distortion due to perturbation.
16
Algorithm 6 RecoverDistanceRR
Input: n × d matrix Xˆ published in a privacy-preserving manner using Algorithm 5; Privacy parameter p
used; Indices a and b of the desired users.
Output: Estimated squared distance between users a and b before perturba-
tion.
1: Let x and y represent vectors corresponding to users a and b before randomized response perturbation,
and let xˆ and yˆ be the corresponding vectors after perturbation in the published matrix Xˆ .
2: Output dist2RR(usera, userb) =
‖xˆ−yˆ‖2
2
−2dp(1−p)
(1−2p)2
Theorem 3. Algorithms 5 and 6 satisfy the following utility guarantees:
1. dist2RR is an unbiased estimator of ‖x− y‖22:
E[dist2RR(x, y)] = ‖x− y‖22.
2. Deviations on squared distances are bounded as follows:
∣∣dist2RR(x, y)− ‖x− y‖22∣∣ ≤
√
d log(2/δRR)√
2(1− 2p)2
with probability at least 1− δRR.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let x and y be two vectors which after going through the randomized response process
yield perturbed vectors xˆ and yˆ. Let w = ‖x− y‖22. We prove that dist2RR(y, x) is an unbiased estimate for
w and is tightly concentrated around w.
Claim 1. Assume wlog that x and y differ in the first w bits and agree on the remaining d − w bits.
In the first w bits, E[‖xˆ − yˆ‖22] is the expected number of positions where neither x nor y get flipped or
both get flipped. In the remaining d − w positions, E[‖xˆ − yˆ‖22] is the expected number of positions where
one gets flipped and not the other. Consequently, E[‖xˆ − yˆ‖22] = ((1 − p)2 + p2)w + 2p(1 − p)(d − w) =
(1− 2p)2w + 2p(1− p)d. Thus
E[distRR(x, y)] =
E[‖xˆ− yˆ‖22]− 2dp(1− p)
(1− 2p)2 = w = ‖y − x‖
2
2.
Claim 2. Observe that for any two bit values, the probability that the distance between them remains
unchanged is q = p2+(1−p)2, corresponding to both bits either being flipped or both remaining unchanged.
Accordingly, the probability that the distance between any two bits changes is 1− q.
Let Ii denote the indicator random variable corresponding to the distance between ith bit of x and y
remaining unchanged despite perturbation. Then each Ii can be viewed as an independent Bernoulli trial,
with Pr[Ii = 1] = q.
Let a =
∑w
i=1 Ii, and b =
∑d
i=w+1 Ii. In other words, let a be the number of bit positions among the
first w bits in which the distance between bits remains unchanged, i.e., remains 1, and let b be the number
of bit positions among the remaining d−w bits, where the distance between bits changed (i.e., increases to
1), due to perturbation introduced by Algorithm 5. Then ‖xˆ− yˆ‖22 = a+ b.
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By Hoeffding’s inequality (applied to d independent random variables, the variance of each of which is
bounded):
Pr
[
‖xˆ− yˆ‖22 − E[‖xˆ− yˆ‖22]| ≥ γ
]
= Pr
[
|a+ b − E[a+ b]| ≥ γ
]
≤ 2 exp(−2γ
2
d
).
Therefore,
Pr
[ ∣∣dist2RR(y, x)− ‖y − x‖22∣∣ ≥ γ] = Pr
[ ∣∣∣∣‖yˆ − xˆ‖22 − 2dp(1− p)(1− 2p)2 − ‖y − x‖22
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
]
= Pr
[ ∣∣∣∣‖yˆ − xˆ‖22 + (1 − 2p)2w − E[‖yˆ − xˆ‖22](1− 2p)2 − ‖y − x‖22
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
]
= Pr
[
[
∥∥|yˆ − xˆ‖22 − E[‖yˆ − xˆ‖22]∣∣ ≥ γ(1− 2p)2
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−2γ
2(1− 2p)4
d
)
.
Plugging in γ =
√
d log( 2
δRR
)
2(1−2p)4 , we obtain the desired inequality.
4.3.3 Comparison between PrivateProjection and RandomizedResponse
In Theorems 2 and 3, we showed that both PrivateProjection (PP) and RandomizedResponse (RR)
algorithms preserve the expected squared distance between pairs of users, and computed the bounds on how
likely it is that the actual values are concentrated around the expectation.
Since both concentration bounds are known to be tight in practice (see Venkatasubramanian andWang [31]
for an empirical study of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform), we follow the standard practice of compar-
ing the concentration guarantees to determine which of the two privacy-preserving algorithms would better
preserve utility.
Consider the case when k is fixed. When the squared distance is O(
√
k), we show that both algorithms
are inaccurate, when the squared distance is between
√
k and
√
dk/ǫ2 our PrivateProjection algorithm is
more accurate, and when the squared distance is larger than
√
dk/ǫ2, RandomizedResponse is preferable.
To see why, consider that it follows from Lemma 3 that for Algorithm 5 to satisfy (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy,
the flip probability p has to be such that p ≥ 11+eǫ ≈ 1/2 − ǫ/4, which is accurate to within 10% for
ǫ < 1. For the purpose of comparison we choose σ = 2
√
ln(n)/ǫ, resulting in (ǫ, 1/n)-differential privacy
according to Theorem 1. This is a conservative setting of the privacy parameters, roughly corresponding to
a single violation of the (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy guarantee over n users. Then, equating failure probabilities
µ = δRR = δJL = δN = δ
2
χ for some µ ≪ 1, we have λJL = Θ(
√
log(1/µ)/
√
k), λχ2 = Θ(
√
log(1/µ)),
λN = Θ(
√
log(1/µ)) for some k. Fix two vectors x, y ∈ Rd and compare the error of the estimates dist2PP(x, y)
and dist2RR(x, y) of the true squared ℓ2-distance ‖x−y‖22. As long as
√
k < ‖x−y‖22 <
√
dk/ǫ2, which controls
the first term of the bound (4), and k(lnn)2 ≪ d, which bounds the second term, the estimate dist2PP(x, y)
is closer to the true distance, and hence PrivateProjection outperforms RandomizedResponse. The
exact constants separating these regions depend on the privacy parameters and failure probabilities δ′s.
Note however that the target dimension k is not fixed, but rather is selected by the curator. k can be
selected with the goal of finding the sweet spot between preserving privacy and the utility of a given algorithm.
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Alternatively, several sketches with different values of k can be released so as to preserve distances at multiple
scales, each consuming its share of the privacy budget.
5 Discussion
In this section, we describe how user sketches released in a privacy-preserving way can be used by third
parties, and conclude by discussing the limitations of sketches and our privacy guarantees.
5.1 Applications
We begin by re-iterating exactly what can be safely published:
1. The d attribute meanings in the original vector space, assuming the meanings themselves are not sen-
sitive, or the ones that are published via a method similar to the one in [20] or [16].
2. The Johnson-Lindenstrauss projection matrix P .
3. For each user x, their userID, together with their perturbed sketch xP +∆.
There are several actions that the third party can perform with this published information, depending on
what kind of additional information the third party possesses about the users and the goal the third party
is trying to achieve.
Segmentation: User sketches can be segmented via some clustering algorithm and then information
known to the third party about some members of the cluster can be generalized to the rest of the cluster.
There is convincing evidence that segmentation of users into clusters is effective in some contexts [4,25,27,33].
Nearest Neighbors: Another application of perturbed sketches is finding nearest neighbors. For ex-
ample, finding users most similar to an already known one can be useful in the context of online dating, and
product and movie recommendations.
5.2 Limitations
Although our algorithm offers a method for privacy-preserving sharing of user data with third parties in a
way that enables user-user distance computations, there are other tasks for which the user data shared using
our method would not be useful to third parties. We also discuss the limitations of the privacy protections
we provide.
5.2.1 Utility Limitations
An important limitation of our work from the utility perspective is that the dimensions of the user sketches
are impossible to interpret. As a consequence, the only way for a third party to select users satisfying a
particular attribute is to project the vector corresponding to this attribute in the higher-dimensional space
to the lower-dimensional space, and then perform the distance computation between user sketches and the
obtained lower-dimensional attribute vector. However, as explained in §4.3.3, this computation would fall
into the range of squared distance values for which both PrivateProjection and RandomizedResponse
perform poorly.
Furthermore, the proposed computation of user sketches weighs all attributes equally, which may not
be desirable for third parties who want to prioritize similarity between users in some of the attributes over
others. Computing multiple projections, each based on a different subset or weighing of the attributes would
require use of additional privacy budget for each projection, as well as necessitate precluding the possibility
of collusion among third parties.
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Another limitation, which is a challenge for much of the privacy literature, is that our sketches provide
a static snapshot of user data, and would require additional privacy budget in order to update them as the
user information changes. The work of [13] offers directions for possibly overcoming this challenge.
5.2.2 Privacy Limitations
While our work takes an important step forward, privacy is more complex than ensuring that a third party
cannot infer a particular attribute of a user. For example, if many of the attributes are correlated or
representative of a higher-level user feature, then our techniques do not prevent a third party from inferring
that. In other words, our guarantees apply to a constant number of attributes, but not to a persistent trend
that exists in the data. Depending on the context, it may be more powerful to first categorize the attributes
into a coarser granularity prior to producing perturbed sketches.
Finally, as we explained in the Introduction, the goal of our work is to enable third parties to perform
distance computations and clustering on users. Clearly, our work is not relevant for settings where such
computations and privacy are fundamentally at odds, i.e., scenarios where the underlying data is so sensitive
that even the ability to identify that two users are similar constitutes a privacy violation.
6 Related Work
Liu et al. [22] introduce and motivate the problem of releasing data to third parties with a goal that the
original sensitive information cannot be inferred while preserving analytic properties of the data, such as
inner product and Euclidean distance computations. Their approach is based on random projection to a
lower-dimensional subspace using a projection matrix drawn from a distribution unknown to the adversary.
The key distinction from our work is that they do not utilize an operational definition for what it means to
protect the privacy of the data, and therefore, as they point out, there are scenarios in which an adversary can
find approximations to original data (e.g., if the data is restricted to Boolean domain or adversary possesses
certain background knowledge). Follow-up works [14, 30] propose concrete attacks and demonstrate the
vulnerabilities of the approach. Our use of differential privacy and addition of properly calibrated random
noise after the projection enables us to provide a rigorous privacy guarantee, as well as gain insight into the
change in utility depending on projected dimension used. Mukherjee et al. [28] propose enabling distance-
based mining algorithms over private data using Fourier-related transforms, but their approach has the same
drawbacks as Liu et al. [22].
We discussed randomized response in §4.3 and compared its performance with our method in §4.3.3. In
terms of privacy, randomized response offers a slightly better privacy guarantee. However, from a utility
perspective, randomized response does not preserve “small” distances as effectively as the present work.
Concretely, for users that are less than
√
dk distance apart, our method provides stronger guarantee than
randomized response. Since third parties are likely interested in preserving small distances, we believe that
our approach is more suitable for typical data mining applications.
From a differential privacy perspective, alternative solutions could be used to attack our problem. For
example, Blum et al. [5] give a method of running k-Means on a private data set maintained by a trusted
administrator. Their goal is to produce k cluster centers that are not too far from the k cluster centers
that k-Means would produce if the algorithm had access to the private data. Our goal differs in that we
seek to publish data (or enable its utilization) along with the userIDs and enable identification of users who
belong to the same cluster. Also, our noisy sketches can also be used for other distance-based computations
such as nearest neighbors. Finally, another possible direction is not to publish any data and only allow
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black-box queries to the first-party data provider, where the answers to such queries are perturbed [12, 23].
This approach may place considerable burden on the first-party data provider, and consumes privacy budget
with each query posed.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed a viable solution to the challenge of publishing user data for enabling computation of distance
between users, without revealing the values of user data attributes. The key insight behind our technique is
that by projecting users to a lower-dimensional space, we can limit the amount of noise we add to each user’s
data, while also reaping the benefit of preserving distances. We also compared our proposed solution to other
candidate solutions, such as directly adding noise to the pairwise distances or adding noise to each attribute
of a user, and showed that our method is preferable for potential applications such as user segmentation and
nearest neighbor search.
There is ample opportunity to improve upon our results as the problem of privacy-preserving data sharing
with third parties is naturally more complex than sharing in a way that enables distance computations. For
example, third parties would benefit from data that enables computation of other data-mining primitives
and from ability to operate on dynamically changing data [13].
A Appendix
Lemma 4. Let X1, . . . , Xn are i.i.d. variables drawn from χ
2
k (chi-squared distribution with k degrees of
freedom). For any x > 0
Pr[
√
max
i
Xi >
√
k +
√
2x] < exp(lnn− x).
Proof. We use the bound due to Laurent and Massart [21, Lemma 1] on the tail probability of the chi-squared
distribution:
Pr[X ≥ k + 2
√
kx+ 2x] ≤ exp(−x),
whereX ∼ χ2k. We establish the claim by taking the union bound over n independent variables and observing
that √
k + 2
√
kx+ 2x <
√
(
√
k +
√
2x)2 =
√
k +
√
2x.
for x > 0.
Lemma 5. Suppose X is drawn from N(0, σ2). Then
Pr[|X | < x] ≥ 1− exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
,
Pr[|X | < x] ≥ 1− 2σ
x
√
2π
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
.
The second bound is stronger than the first when x ≥ 0.8σ.
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Proof. Expressing the tail probabilities in terms of the CDF of the standard Normal distribution denoted as
Φ we have (the first bound):
Pr[X < −x] = Φ(−x/σ),
Pr[X > −x] = 1− Φ(x/σ),
and thus
Pr[|X | < x] = 1− (Φ(−x/σ) + 1− Φ(x/σ)) = Φ(x/σ) − Φ(−x/σ)
=
1
2
(
1 + erf(
x
σ
√
2
)− 1− erf( −x
σ
√
2
)
)
= erf(
x
σ
√
2
).
Alternatively (the second bound)
Pr[|X | < x] = 1− 2Pr[X > x] ≥ 1− 2σ
x
√
2π
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
.
The second bound is be stronger than the first as long as
2σ
1
x
√
2π
≤ 1,
which holds when x ≥ 0.8σ.
Lemma 6. Let X be an arbitrary distribution over Rk and Y ∼ Nk(0, σ2), independent of X. Then
〈X,Y 〉 ∼ N(0, ‖X‖22σ2).
In particular,
E[〈X,Y 〉] = 0.
Proof. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xk) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yk). Then
〈X,Y 〉 ∼
k∑
i=1
XiYi ∼
k∑
i=1
XiN(0, σ
2) ∼
k∑
i=1
N(0, X2i σ
2) ∼ N(0, σ2
k∑
i=1
X2i ) ∼ N(0, σ2‖X‖22),
by scaling and additive properties of the Gaussian distribution.
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